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UNITED STATES POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

I. Present Situation in the Area

In the Middle East and South Asia, U.S. policy seeks to create political and economic strength and to assist the countries of the area to contribute what they can to their own and free world defense. In this vast region which includes North Africa, India and the tier of countries on the southern periphery of the Sino-Soviet domain stretching from Greece on the Aegean through Burma to the Bay of Bengal, there are interests of great importance to us and our Allies: bases, oil, strategic communications, and millions of inhabitants, largely poverty-stricken, suspicious of the West, animated by a fierce nationalism, divided by political disputes and religious and racial differences and a potential prey to Communism.

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II. U.S. Objectives

Unrest is endemic throughout the area and acute at several points but an armed attack on the Middle East segment could be made only by the Soviet Union and this is unlikely except as part of a global war. Our immediate problem is to alleviate the conditions which favor the adversary in the cold war, and to develop local defense potentials.

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On the political and diplomatic front, we should demonstrate that United States interest in the security of the area is firm and continuous but not acquisitive, extortionate or unilateral; when political conditions permit, the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization would be useful in promoting political cooperation of the Moslem states in the area and encouraging integrated military planning.

We should continue to do what we can to mitigate Arab-Israeli; French-Arab; and Indo-Pakistan tensions.

Within the limits set by a loyal respect for our obligations toward our NATO partners and for the objectives we share with them, we should reserve our freedom of action in those instances in which the policies of the United Kingdom and France conflict with these of the Moslem world to the extent that the situation threatens to divert or reduce the strength of the free world against communist exploitation or aggression.

In framing our policies and aid programs we must recognize that perhaps more than in any other area in the non-Communist world there exists in this region the tinder for Communist conflagration; if the flanks of the area at Iran and Indochina collapse, there may fall under Communist domination not only incalculable material resources but also most of the unsatisfied and the colored peoples of the world.

We should

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We should constantly review our informational and psychological warfare programs for opportunities to broaden support for American policies in this area and to make these intelligible to peoples of a widely different culture.

III. Courses of Action

Our present economic and military aid programs are inadequate to support these policies, or to prevent deterioration at neuralgic points like Iran and Egypt. Yet for an allocation which would not be large compared to that devoted to other areas substantial results could be obtained. The unsettled conditions of the region, its very vastness, and its occasional unreceptivity to the West impose a prudent limitation on our expenditure, as does the fact that the major military threat is probably not immediate.

When we come to developing local defense forces, we find that except in Turkey and possibly Pakistan, there is no immediate opportunity to create units of significant strength in global war. Initially, the purposes to be served by these build-ups would be to (1) strengthen the structure of gov ment; (2) provide internal security; (3) obtain and protect base and transit rights for free world military forces.

In addition to continuing grant aid and military assistance to Greece and Turkey, the following are some specific points which our programs should include:

a. Additional

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a. Additional military assistance to the area including:

(1) strengthening Pakistan, which lies on the Iranian flank and in the area of possible Communist expansion:

(2) Prompt delivery of some military equipment to Egypt with more to follow as an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez defense is approached.

b. A modest economic development program in the Arab States, Iran and Israel in addition to the current refugee-aid program. If the Anglo-Iranian oil issue continues unsettled, the U.S. may be required to take action to prevent economic collapse in Iran.

c. We should continue a conscious effort to improve Indo-American relations manifesting a more understanding attitude toward the compulsions on India to maintain an ostensivly "neutralist" and independent stand. Our policy recognizes that India is potentially the pivot of the whole area, and that results might be disastrous if its moderate regimes were to be forced from power. We should explore means of developing a greater harmony of policy between the United States and India particularly in Asian matters, wherever practical. We should expand our economic development program

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for India and Pakistan in an effort to increase agricultural and industrial productivity.

d. We should continue efforts to advance the resolution of such disputes as Kashmir; the state of war between the Arab countries and Israel and the French-North African troubles, taking account of our obligations toward our NATO partners.

e. While we continue to give Israel some financial assistance, we should demonstrate to the Arab world that we do not intend to sponsor Israel exclusively nor to give her discriminatory preference. At an appropriate date we should reaffirm the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. We should make it clear that it is our will that national borders should be respected.

f. We should continue to study the possibilities of a general approach to military, political, social and economic problems of the area, and where possible, of building toward a collective solution as in the development of MEDO. We should begin efforts with Egypt where prospects for cooperation are more auspicious since the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan accord; and undertake at a later date more formal commitments to support other countries which give evidence of determination to defend themselves in cooperation with the West.

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